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Abstract
There are many methodology articles about model building in economics that distin-
guishes models from theories. Most were criticisms against the overuse of formal math-
ematics in economics. Proponents of using and developing formal mathematical models 
of economic theories defended this by claiming that mathematics is just a language, 
nothing more. But as Axel Leijonhufvud noted, ‘English is a language too’. 
The latest generation of economic model builders do not understand such criticisms 
as they do not see a meaningful distinction between models and theories whenever 
that distinction is to be based on mathematics because theory today is seen as being 
any model involving mathematics. If any distinction is to be made, it will be between 
theoretical versus empirical models. 
This article will explain the various ways model building has changed in the last 30 
years and how some model builders are returning to the old idea of a model of econom-
ics where mathematics is not the central aspect of model building.
Key-words: models, mathematics, economics. 
Resumen
Existe una multiplicidad de artículos metodológicos referidos a la construcción de mo-
delos en económía que diferencian los modelos de las teorías. La mayoría de ellos cri-
tican el abuso de las formalizaciones matemáticas en economía. Quienes adscriben a la 
utilización y el desarrollo de modelos matemáticos formales de teorías económicas, de-
fienden esta práctica argumentando que la matemática es sólo un lenguaje. Pero como 
ha señalado Axel Leijonhufvud, “el castellano también es un lenguaje”. 
La joven generación de constructores de modelos económicos no comprende tal crítica 
porque no ven ninguna distinción significativa entre modelos y teorías, en la medida en 
que tal distinción esté basada en las matemáticas, dado que “teoría” hoy es entendida 
como todo modelo que involucre matemáticas. Si es necesario hacer alguna distinción, 
se hace entre modelos empíricos y modelos teóricos. 
Este artículo explicará las distintas maneras en las cuales la construcción de modelos ha 
cambiado en los últimos 30 años, y cómo algunos constructores de modelos están re-
tornando a la vieja idea de un modelo de economía donde la matemática no constituya 
el aspecto central en la construcción de modelos.
Palabras claves: modelos, matemáticas, economía.
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Introduction.
There are many methodology articles about model building in econom-
ics that distinguishes models from theories. However, most, maybe all of 
them until recently were mostly criticisms against the overuse of formal 
mathematics in economics. Proponents of using and developing formal 
mathematical models of economic theories defended this by claiming that 
mathematics is just a language, nothing more. But as Axel Leijonhufvud 
noted, ‘English is a language too’ (Leijonhufvud 1997, p. 198). 
Undoubtedly, the latest generation of economic model builders do not 
understand such criticisms as they do not see a meaningful distinction 
between models and theories whenever that distinction is to be based on 
mathematics. And this is for a good reason. Theory today is seen as being 
any model involving mathematics. So, no longer is mathematics used to 
distinguish between models and theories. If any distinction is to be made, 
it will be between theoretical versus empirical models. 
For me, realization of this situation turned out to be problematic when I 
set about producing a second edition of my 1989 book on the methodol-
ogy of economic model building. The basic presumption of that book was, 
of course, that theories and models were very separate things. Specifi-
cally, model building in my 1989 book was seen to be a three-step pro-
cess. The first step involved a non-mathematical behavioural economics 
hypothesis that one would use to explain some economic phenomena. At 
minimum, this step identified a list of endogenous variables of interest to 
be explained and a list of ‘causes’, that is, a list of exogenous variables. 
This separation between exogenous and endogenous variables is central 
to economic explanations. Changes in exogenous variables are deemed to 
cause changes in the endogenous variables. But, any conceivable change in 
an endogenous variable (perhaps as a movement towards an equilibrium) 
will not cause any exogenous variable to change. The posited behavioural 
hypothesis specifies how the values exogenous variables cause the values of 
the endogenous variables. An example might be how a exogenous change 
in technology might lead to an increase in the output of a good without 
changes in other inputs such as labour and capital. 
The second step in model building would be to represent the behavioural 
hypothesis with one or more equations. In macroeconomics, an example 
might be the notion that the level of aggregate consumption (C) is a linear 
function involving the level of aggregate income (Y ) – that is, we would 
assume C = α + βY. 
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If the product of the first two steps are to be applied to observable data, 
the third step would be to specify criteria to be used to decide whether 
the resulting model does or does not ‘fit’ in some sense. If the model is 
not applied in this manner, one might instead specify an initial value for 
the α and perhaps one for the β which would be used to generate poten-
tially observable data. If one is not just assuming initial values, one could 
‘calibrate’ the model by using a separate source of information about the 
values of α and β. 
The youngest generation of economic models builders would not have 
seen the first two steps a separate events. And so, I doubt any of them 
would have understood much of my 1989 book. And as such, I decided it 
would be pointless to produce a second edition as the audience, namely 
those who obtained their PhDs before 1980, would be small and shrink-
ing as the older generation of model builders retire from the scene. And 
as a result, I decided to write a different book, one that would try to 
bridge this gap as well as, perhaps, show that what I will be calling the 
pre-1980 view of models has not gone away but is now reappearing in a 
different form. In this article I will briefly explain some of what I learned 
about model building in today’s economics and what will be more fully 
discussed in my forthcoming book, Model Building in Economics: Its Purposes 
and Limitations. 
The reason for recognizing the 1980 turning point.
The specific year of 1980 is somewhat arbitrary, but the turning point is 
real. In starting to work on my forthcoming book, I first tried to survey 
my colleagues about how models are used in their various sub-disciplines 
of economics. But I was having a difficult time. My younger colleagues 
could not understand what I was talking about when asking them how 
they would build models of their proffered theoretical ideas. My older 
colleagues had no difficulty helping me. So, I decided to try a different, 
more fundamental survey by asking them if they understood the following 
quotation from page 886 of a 1974 article by Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter (bold emphasis added):
In economics (as in physics) what we refer to as a theory is more 
a set of basic premises – a point of view that delineates the phe-
nomena to be explained and modes of acceptable explanation 
– than a set of testable propositions. The theory points to cer-
tain phenomena and key explanatory variables and mechanisms, 
but generally is quite flexible about the expected conclusions of 
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empirical research, and a wide class of models is consistent with 
it. (Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter 1974, p. 886).
First I asked if they understood this quotation. And again, my older col-
leagues said they did, but my younger colleagues said they had no clue 
what Nelson and Winter were talking about. From a little research on the 
internet, I decided the key determinant of whether they did or did not un-
derstand the quotation seemed to be whether my survey subjects did their 
graduate work in economics after or before the aforementioned 1980. Of 
course, the question is: why 1980?.
While discussing with some of my graduate students a few years ago, I was 
told that in most of their classes where they were given problems to solve 
– the kind you find at the end of textbook chapters – the problems were 
always mathematical problems. Many years ago, when I was a student, this 
was not the case. Instead, we were always given verbal problems or ques-
tions and our first task was to turn these into mathematical problems or 
questions to solve and answer. It should be noted that those of my younger 
colleagues who grew up in the old Chicago tradition still do it this old 
way, but that is about it. From what I could determine, the transformation 
to what we now see almost everywhere began in the 1970s as more and 
more graduate students discovered the virtues of mathematical rigor. And 
by 1980, the transformation was complete. With this in mind, I now turn 
to looking at some of what I have learned about how models are used in 
economics today.
Microeconomic vs. macroeconomic theoretical model building.
While many still think of John Maynard Keynes when talking about mac-
roeconomics, Keynesian macro models are only tangentially related to 
what Keynes argued for in his famous 1936 General Theory. The Keynesian 
macro models are called Keynesian only because the government is given 
a recognized role in those models. Keynesian models, which were origi-
nally promoted in the 1950s by Donald Patinkin, were based on general 
equilibrium models. After all, it can be said, what’s more macro than the 
whole economy represented by a Walrasian general equilibrium model. In 
effect, it would be argued, macroeconomics is just aggregative economics 
(see Boland forthcoming, ch. 1 and 2). 
Macroeconomics did not start being recognized in economics curricula 
as a distinctly different economics from microeconomics until the late 
1940s. And many of the courses that were to be called macroeconomics or 
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macroeconomic theory courses were just renamed business cycle courses. 
And in many cases, microeconomic theory courses were just renamed 
price theory courses. It was not until the 1960s that macroeconomics 
courses were clearly on an equal footing with microeconomics courses.
For the most part, what was taught in microeconomics courses did not 
change much from what was taught in price theory type courses in the 
mid-1930s so it was easy to write a microeconomics textbook. Writing or 
selecting a macroeconomic textbooks, however, was often problematic, 
due mostly to the ideological tensions created by the explicit recognition 
of a role for government. Given such recognition, those who thought the 
market can solve all problems were usually reluctant to embrace Keynes-
ian models. And there was always the struggle between those who tried 
to follow Keynes and promote aggregate economics where an equilibrium 
perspective would not be an essential perspective and those who adopted 
John Hicks’ ISLM view of Keynes which was equilibrium oriented. As 
a result, choosing a textbook to use to teach a macroeconomics course 
was always a challenge. Choosing a microeconomics textbook was rarely 
problematic. All microeconomic textbooks would just present a version 
of Book V of Alfred Marshall’s 1890 Principles of Economics. 
Today, things seem very different. Macroeconomics, at least when it comes 
to most graduate research, has now been unified around what is called 
the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model – a model 
that is often attributed to the work Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu 
(1954). What their work did was to expand the Walrasian static equilib-
rium model to cover both equilibria over multiple years and do so with a 
recognition that the future is uncertain. What is interesting about this is 
that both 1960s Keynesian model builders and those who in the 1970s re-
jected Keynesian models as useless for government policy assessment can 
now use the same basic model, the DSGE model. It is also claimed that 
this model makes it possible to incorporate imperfect competition, sticky 
prices and so on without giving up the equilibrium nature of the model.
Microeconomics is now becoming less united. This is primarily the re-
sult of the development of behavioural and evolutionary economics and 
as well as the ongoing critical examination in the form of experimental 
economics that continues to put some of the basic notions of Marshallian 
economics in doubt. And of course, the mathematics of game theory also 
presents an alternative to the math that Marshall relied on.
Keynesian macroeconomics detractors in the 1960s thought that any com-
plete macro model must have microfoundations. And in the 1970s, this re-
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appeared as part of the Lucas Critique which noted that Keynesian models 
presumed their parameters were like physical constants such as the gravity 
constant – as if people were mechanical decision makers rather than in-
telligent decision makers who, perhaps, can anticipate effects of govern-
ment policy changes. Such anticipations can easily result in changes to the 
parameters. So, again, one must rely on microeconomics to completely 
understand the macro-economy. 
For those macro model builders who do think microfoundations are nec-
essary, two primary approaches have been taken. One is the aforemen-
tioned DSGE models which abandon aggregative economics for general 
equilibrium economics. The other is the infamous Representative Agent 
device first employed by Marshall in his later editions where he attempted 
to represent a whole industry with a single firm. 
This is not the place to go into details about these approaches – inter-
ested readers will find more about these in my forthcoming book. Here 
it is enough to note that, as explained by Alan Kirman (1992), there are 
serious logical problems with the idea of a representative agent given the 
diversity of any real economy. Interestingly, proponents of the representa-
tive agent never seem to recognize Kirman’s article. Of course, diversity 
is not ruled out in DSGE models and as such many model builders prefer 
not opting for the mathematical convenience of the representative agent.
Some identify two separate ways microeconomic models are distinguished 
from macroeconomic models. One is to claim that macroeconomic mod-
els – particularly in the form of DSGE models – can be dynamic where as 
Marshallian microeconomic models are limited to a static analysis of the 
neighbourhood proprieties of deviations about an equilibrium (viz, Mar-
shall’s partial equilibrium analysis of his Book V). There is considerable 
doubt about whether the dynamics of the DSGE are real dynamics in the 
sense that real time is not reversible. The other way is to claim that micro-
economic models can provide causal explanations but macroeconomics 
cannot – at least, not those without microfoundations. And there is doubt 
about this since a cause can be identified only in the case of Marshall’s ce-
teris paribus methodology of explanation. Again, there is more discussion 
of these claims and counter-claims in Chapters 2 and 5 of my forthcoming 
book.
Microeconomic vs. macroeconomic empirical model building.
In the 1960s it was common for economists to distinguish between theo-
retical and applied economics – so, the distinction between theoretical 
Lawrence A. Boland - Model building in economics 11
CIECE
versus empirical models is not particularly new. What is relatively new 
over the last few years is the explicitly identified field of empirical micro-
economics that is increasingly being identified as a distinctive research 
field by new PhDs. I suspect that this field has been created just to make 
this all conform to the theoretical versus empirical distinction used for 
models in general. What is included in the field of empirical microeco-
nomics seems merely to be various pre-existing sub-fields of applied mi-
croeconomics such as labour theory, family or household economics, edu-
cational economics, health economics, etc. In other words, the distinction 
between micro- and macro-economic models is, as it has usually been, 
between the kind of data being explained. Probably, the only relatively 
new aspect of empirical microeconomics is the widespread use of econo-
metrics (for more, see Boland forthcoming, ch. 5 and 6).
It has been recently argued that unlike large macro models, empirical 
microeconomic models are intended to address questions of causality in 
a manner that is claimed to be reliable and convincing (e.g., Angrist and 
Pischke 2010). Some critics will claim that the use of econometrics by 
itself would make this claim questionable. Primarily, this is because to 
use econometrics in building an empirical model one has to make many 
assumptions for the convenience of using econometrics that some claim 
are themselves fragile at best and unrealistic at worst. If the only reason 
for building empirical microeconomic models is to be able to use econo-
metrics to explain (i.e., ‘fit’) observed microeconomic data, then perhaps 
this can be acceptable. But, surely, identifying causes is a more demanding 
purpose than just trying to get a good ‘fit’. Identifying causes requires 
an appropriate research design. Of course, one’s research design itself 
depends on why one is building the model in the first place. And, more 
important, any claimed credibility or reliability will obviously depend 
primarily on the quality of one’s research design.
N. Gregory Mankiw (2006) identifies two different purposes for building 
models. On the one hand, it can be that of a social engineer – that is, for the 
purpose of solving practical problems. On the other hand, it can be that of 
a scientist – that is, for the purpose of understanding how the world works. 
Mankiw was talking about the history of macroeconomics but it could just 
as easily apply to empirical microeconomics today. 
Given Mankiw’s perspective, it could be said that if one’s purpose for 
building an empirical microeconomic model is scientific, we would usu-
ally find that one’s research design would involve experimentation. In 
this regard, almost everyone agrees that it would be impossible for one 
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to conduct an experiment on an entire macro-economy. The data to be 
used, even if deliberately obtained, are just passive macro observations. 
As such, if this is all that one has to use, it would be difficult to distinguish 
such activity from that conducted to study astronomy. Nevertheless, it 
is conceivable that one could use such a model if it is only to be used to 
understand the workings of a very small sector of an economy or just one 
particular market. In this limited sense, perhaps conducting an empirical 
microeconomics experiment is not out of the question. A typical empiri-
cal microeconomic experiment might concern the effectiveness of capital 
punishment or the effects of class size (see Angrist and Pischke 2010). It 
can be argued that if the research is properly designed, then it can be reli-
able and convincing. Skeptics will probably not be easily convinced.
Non-experimental empirical macroeconomic model building has been 
around for a long time. The first models are usually attributed to Jan Tin-
bergen and his work in the late 1930s. Subsequently, work begun in the 
1940 led in the 1950s to the so-called Klein-Goldberger models with 
25 equations and followed in the 1960s with a larger Brookings model 
that had 400 equations. Today, there are many commercial econometric 
macroeconomic models such as the DRI/McGraw-Hill model. Some of 
these have more than a 1000 equations. 
Fans of building macroeconomic models (e.g., Chari and Kehoe 2006) see 
much progress over the last thirty or more years leading to many govern-
ments undertaking policy changes suggested by what these macro-models 
propose. Critics (e.g., Mankiw 2006, Solow 2008) see this as the view 
of a very limited group of macroeconomic model builders, specifically a 
group including those who developed macro models using the representa-
tive agent approach that many find very suspect. It can be claimed, that is, 
that such models are not really macro models as they are usually based on 
a single all-knowing maximizing individual. Also, some critics see these 
models to be relying too heavily on quickly clearing perfect markets. In 
other words, the critics do not see these models being sufficiently realis-
tic. But, above all, the critics can also question the credibility of just these 
types of macroeconomic model built over the last thirty years since they 
are the same types of model that was guiding the governments leading to 
the ‘Great Recession’ of 2007–08!  
Macro-econometric models: two approaches.
As already noted, DSGE models dominate macroeconomic model build-
ing. This is clearly the case in North America, though, perhaps, not so 
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much in parts of Europe and South America where DSGE methodology is 
often rejected. The main issue that separates the two approaches is wheth-
er one builds their model (usually, a DSGE model) first and then apply 
it to available data by econometrically estimating the parameters of the 
model or instead, analyze the data by first creating a model of the data, 
making assumptions about the nature of the data to decide the statistical 
method needed for any estimation of any model. This latter approach is 
advocated because the usual textbook econometric estimation methods 
are often applied to models whose assumptions are inconsistent with the 
statistical or probabilistic structure of the data (see Spanos 2011).   
Needless to say, this recognition has led to charges and counter charges 
as well as various methodological disputes. But it can also be argued that 
there are reasons for the dominance of approach based on using DSGE 
models first and then applying them to data. The primary reason involves 
matters of academic sociology – specifically, the institutional activities in-
volved with promotion and tenure. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the num-
ber of PhD-granting universities began to increase at a fast rate. One of 
the outcomes of the increase was that departments grew larger and more 
diverse such that the task of assessing performance of promotion or ten-
ure candidates became increasingly difficult. Few members of any tenure 
committee would likely know much about all the various sub-disciplines 
represented in any department. Eventually, to get around this difficulty, 
most departments started counting publications as a primary measure of 
performance rather than, say, teaching abilities. In this regard, any smart 
candidate for promotion or tenure would chose to engage in research that 
would maximize the number of publications. Eventually, the DSGE mod-
els became recognized as a useful tool for this maximization. After all, the 
other approach that requires tedious assessing and modeling the structure 
of the data would require a lot more time – and to a certain extent would 
often show some empirical macro models to be unacceptable if realism 
or even logical consistency matters. And of course, with this other ap-
proach, far fewer publishable papers would be the ultimate result. Hence 
the dominance of the DSGE modeling approach.
Building theoretical models using game theory.
While most of the current game theoretical model building is post-1980, 
one can make a case that it may still indicate a slow movement back to 
the pre-1980s view of the relationship between theories and models. This 
is partly due to the fact that game theory is nothing more than a form of 
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mathematical modeling. This is how it was understood in the 1950s and 
‘60s. It is also because at one time it was seen to be a way of modeling an 
Edgeworth type of general equilibrium, usually of 2-goods and 2-agents 
in mutual equilibrium as illustrated in the well-known Edgeworth-Bowley 
box. Recall: that box is constructed by putting in opposition the indiffer-
ence maps for the two agents such that their respective zero-utility points 
are in opposing corners of the box. In this way, the box was usually used to 
distinguish a Pareto optimal exchange from that of a non-Pareto optimal 
exchange. The former being a point on a line – usually called the contract 
curve – that connects all the tangency points between the two agents’ 
indifference maps whereas the latter would be any point not on that con-
tract curve and any such point is not Pareto optimal since it is possible for 
one agent to gain without the other losing in an adjusted exchange. As a 
matter of formal mathematical analysis, I think interest in game theoreti-
cal models seemed to fall off once it was recognized that the solution for 
a zero-sum, non-cooperative game turned out to be formally equivalent 
to the solution for any linear programming problem (see further, Boland 
forthcoming, ch. 3 and 4). 
With the notion of the non-Pareto optimal points off the contract curve 
in mind, movement towards the contract curve and thus towards a Pareto 
optimum has many possibilities. The possible-to-reach Pareto optimum 
points extend between two extremes along the contract curve. At one ex-
treme, one agent merely moves along an indifference curve and thus gains 
nothing while the other agent gains the maximum possible. Of course, if 
there were some way to bargain, the other points between the extremes 
could be the reached and these of course would also be Pareto optima. 
Obviously, it would seem, game theory would be an easy way to charac-
terize such a bargain. What is not always mentioned is that the equilibrium 
illustrated in an Edgeworth-Bowley box is not a general equilibrium, per 
se. It is an illustration of one necessary condition for a general equilibrium 
to exist. Specifically, it says if you have a general equilibrium, then it must 
be possible to choose any two goods and any two agents and they will be 
found on their respective contract curve and their indifference curves will 
both be tangent to a line with a slope equal to the relative prices for the 
two goods.
My purpose here was not to discuss the history of game theory. Instead, 
I have presented game theory this way so as to illustrate how one can dis-
cuss an important theoretical notion – the Edgeworth-Bowley box idea 
of a Pareto optimum as a necessary condition for a general equilibrium 
– without building a model but it is a notion that can be represented with 
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a game theoretical model if one so chooses. Seen this way, one can see 
how a game theoretical model is just a case of the pre-1980 perspective 
discussed earlier.
There are, of course, several reasons for why game theory may seem to be 
a worthwhile form of mathematics to use to model exchange equilibria or, 
for that matter, other types of equilibria. One not often discussed is that 
it avoids having to assume continuous differentiable objective functions 
needed for applications of calculus as is common in Marshallian models. 
Another reason is that it allows for involving the diversity that is denied 
by devices such as the representative agent. One could even go so far as 
to argue that evolutionary game theory might be a suitable alternative to 
even macroeconomics (e.g., Boland 2003, ch. 9). 
It should be noted, however, that the requirements for a useful game the-
oretical model are somewhat problematical. The usual game theoretical 
model has to identify not only a finite set of options for each player, but 
the players must know the rules (Kreps 1990, ch. 5). How do they know 
the rules? A key assumption used to assure the existence of an equilibrium 
is the additional notion that both players know that the other player is ‘ra-
tional’ (meaning: a maximizer) and they know the other player knows this 
about themselves. But, as is well recognized, not all games have a solution, 
that is, have a pair of choice options (one for each player) whereby neither 
player would want to change. And some games, as defined by the rules and 
the payoffs, may have multiple solutions. Many tricks (‘refinements’) are 
proposed to overcome the absence of a unique solution, but even when 
there is only one, as with all equilibrium-based explanations, unless there 
are good reasons for why the equilibrium will be attained, such explana-
tions will always be questionable (I explain this in much more detail in 
Chapter 2 of my forthcoming book). 
The role and limitations of experimental and behavioural eco-
nomics.
While today it is not often mentioned by behavioural or experimental 
economists, the history of experimental economics has been closely con-
nected with the history of game theory. It is easy to conceive of how one 
could see using a particular game theoretical model as a promising basis 
for an experiment simply by repeatedly using the game as the experiment. 
But, as the experimental economics pioneer Vernon Smith (1992, p. 275) 
explained, doing so ‘provided an elegant means of demonstrating equilib-
rium concepts and elements of conflict and cooperation in markets’ (Ver-
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non Smith 1992, p. 275) . But, as went he on to note, he ‘never viewed 
these austere environments as constituting the corpus of experimental 
economics’ (Vernon Smith 1992, p. 275). The problem was that the usual 
form of a game with its rules and payoffs seems to trivialize the institu-
tional arrangements of a real market thereby making any experimental re-
sults mostly uninformative particularly with respect to market equilibria.
Today, mere applications of game theory do not seem to be playing much 
of a role in experimental or behavioural economics. The emphasis in ex-
perimental economics methodology now focuses more on the task of de-
signing an experiment for a laboratory setting. One can, however, think 
of the experimental design playing the role of a model of whatever the 
experiment is attempting to test. And ironically, it can easily be argued 
that, as such, experimental and behavioural economics involves just a new 
version the old pre-1980s view of theories and models. Isolating a cho-
sen central behavioural hypothesis of interest is usually the main task for 
producing an experimental design. But, what I am suggesting here is that 
an experimental design is a type of model; it is a model designed to be an 
application of a specific behavioural theory or theoretical proposition (see 
Boland, forthcoming, ch. 8). 
The early days of experimental economics were devoted to testing main-
stream institutions used in microeconomic theories. Vernon Smith is a 
well-known pioneer who in the 1950s and 1960s set about testing basic 
theoretical propositions in the laboratory rather than in the field. One 
of his colleagues in the 1960s, Cliff Lloyd, had a plan (unfulfilled due to 
his death in 1977) to conduct a field test of traditional demand theory 
based on a particular idea about what it would take to empirically re-
fute demand theory (see Lloyd 1965). His plan was to install an agent 
in a Hudson Bay Company general store in Labrador, Canada. This agent 
would simply adjust prices and observe how the customers would re-
spond (Lloyd 1980). For Smith (1962) the laboratory setting allows one 
to control intervening factors such that any falsification or confirmation 
can be logically defended.
Today, we find most experimental economics being dominated by those 
who have followed Smith’s lead. The laboratory is the main venue for 
generating what are considered to be observable and repeatable evidence 
or patterns of behaviour. Robert Sugden (2008) considers these to be 
laboratory produced ‘exhibits’. In this regard, it is easy to see that the 
experimental designs are actually what would have previously been called 
models – models being designed for the purpose of adding support for 
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and giving credibility to a chosen proposition of interest rather than the 
more common notion of their being instead designed for producing falsi-
fying evidence against a theoretical proposition. So, as it stands, one can 
design experiments in order to conduct repeatable laboratory experi-
ments either to general credible ‘exhibits’ or one can design them to gen-
erate evidence that can be used to refute or at least question traditional 
economic theories and behavioural propositions. But many experimental 
model builders are beginning to recognize some unavoidable problems 
are inherent in the logic of model building. Specifically, there are two non-
mutually-exclusive main problems: (1) the questionable ‘external validity’ 
of any test or of any exhibits produced by an experimental design – just 
because it works in the laboratory, does not guarantee it works in the ex-
ternal real world – and (2) the logical problem that Smith (2002) identi-
fies – namely, the inherent ambiguity of any experimental test whenever 
the results depend on the additional assumptions or conditions introduced 
to conduct the experiments. The latter problem is well known in philoso-
phy of science literature. It is what Smith calls the Duhem-Quine prob-
lem. This problem is that, as Smith puts it, ‘experimental results always 
present a joint test of the theory (however well articulated, formally) that 
motivated the test, and all the things you had to do to implement the test’ 
(Smith 2002, p. 98).
The Duhem-Quine problem is an unavoidable because it is a matter of 
logic. For the purpose of using the force of logic, any model consisting 
of more than one assumption – all of which are claimed to be true – is 
really just a compound statement – namely, the conjunction of all of the 
assumptions. As such, the compound statement is true only if all of the 
constituent assumptions are true. And, by assuming all of the constitu-
ent assumptions are true, one is using the logically valid of the model to 
be able to claim that any and all statements logically deduced from the 
conjunction (e.g., a prediction) is true because the compound statement 
is true as required for the use of logic. Of course, economists use models 
(and theories) this way to form explanations of observable events. And 
most important, should a logically (i.e., validly) deduced statement prove 
to be false, then we know only that at least one of the constituent state-
ments of the model is false. And this is where the Duhem-Quine problem 
arises. It is because we simply cannot know which of the constituent state-
ments ‘caused’ the false prediction. Is the deduced statement false due to 
false theoretical behavioural assumptions being tested with the model? 
Or is it due to the false status of one of the assumptions added in the 
construction of the model. And even for an application of a particular ex-
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periment designed to produce credible exhibits, we cannot know whether 
any observed behavioural regularity was not a result of those additional 
assumptions that we would need to make sure the experiment is practical. 
In addition to the Duhem-Quine problem and the problem of external 
validity, Smith identifies a third and unavoidable problem that faces any 
experimental economist. Any experimental model builder who thinks 
an experiment can be designed to produce exhibits that can be used to 
‘induce’ the truth status of some behavioral propositions or hypotheses 
are mistaken, again as a matter of logic (see Boland 1982; 2003, ch. 1). 
As Smith put it, ‘Particular hypotheses derived from any testable theory 
imply certain observational outcomes; the converse is false’ (Smith 2002, 
p. 94). The converse is false because, as David Hume recognized over 200 
years ago, it is impossible to prove (by pure induction) that any empirical 
general (i.e., an ‘all’) statement (such as ‘all decision makers are maximiz-
ers) is true by listing a finite set of particular observations that would be 
true whenever that empirical statement is actually true. Instead, to prove 
the truth status of a general empirical statement, one would have to prove 
the non-existence of any conceivable observations that would be logically 
denied by truth status of that general empirical statement (or in other 
words, it requires ‘proving the negative’ which is not possible for an un-
limited general statement).  
The Duhem-Quine problem is the one methodological problem that al-
most all experimental economists seem to recognize and recognize that it 
cannot be avoided. Many experimental economists have even abandoned 
attempting to straightforwardly refute core theory and now are instead 
trying to use experiments to provide ‘positive evidence of a particular 
regularity in behaviour’ (Sugden 2008, p. 625). Perhaps they are doing 
this simply to avoid making claims about the truth status of falsifying test 
or positive exhibits. For this reason Smith thinks that much of recent lab-
oratory work has been about improving experimental laboratory tech-
nique. He thinks this ‘process is driven by the [Duhem-Quine] problem, 
but practitioners need have no knowledge of the philosophy of science 
literature to take the right next local steps in the laboratory. Myopia here 
is not a handicap’ (Sudgen 2002, p. 103).
What is most important today is that laboratory experiments are being 
used to discover puzzles that theorists need to address. The basic meth-
odological idea involved is simple. Even within the limits of the nature 
of laboratory experiments, microeconomic theory should apply to any 
individual participants in the experiment whenever that experiment in-
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volves making choices. More importantly, whenever an experimental de-
sign produces more than a puzzle by producing what appears to be an 
anomaly, it surely at least indicates that there is work to be done. Maybe 
some aspects of traditional theory do need to be fixed. I think this is what 
Smith means by saying that myopia may not be a handicap, and moreover, 
he is allowing that it still does not avoid the Duhem-Quine problem in-
volved in establishing external validity. 
Experiments are designed to control the quality of the evidence that will 
be produced but of course no single experiment can produce evidence 
that will be 100 percent accurate. This fact is an obstacle for any attempt 
to establish external validity. This of course applies to any evidence wheth-
er it is concerns a claimed anomaly or just some claimed support for a 
behavioural hypothesis being examined in the laboratory. Either type of 
evidence or claim must be qualified since it can only be stochastic – that is, 
it can only be about the probability distribution of observations. Needless 
to say, recognizing this at least also puts a limit to any claims of external 
validity.
As I have been arguing here, an experimental design is a model of some 
chosen economic behaviour that is supposedly explained by microeco-
nomic theory. As such, can anyone using an experiment to claim that some 
observed anomaly constitutes a refutation of some traditional theoreti-
cal explanations of economic choice behaviour also claim that it carries 
some degree of external validity? Again, claiming something that has oc-
curred in a laboratory setting has external validity is problematic. And 
there is what Smith (2002) was warning about in terms of the unavoidable 
Duhem-Quine problem. 
Perhaps the real problem here with on going research in any economic 
laboratory-based claims about refutations, puzzles or ‘exhibits’ is that 
they are all too premature. As Smith (2002) noted, laboratory-based re-
search is in effect an ongoing evolutionary process. It involves learning 
and refining the experimental techniques, particularly those used to test 
microeconomic theories and models. Although many of the claims, par-
ticularly claims of external validity, can be dismissed on the grounds of 
the Duhem-Quine problem, one can see it leading to improvements in 
experimental designs. Nevertheless, unlike the experiments conducted in 
the laboratories of the physical sciences involving inanimate objects like 
atoms rather than the sentient beings involved in experiments conducted 
in economics laboratories, whether the resulting improved experimental 
techniques that Smith sees being fostering might overcome the problem 
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of external validity is, I think, still at least an open question. 
Economic model building from a philosophy of science per-
spective.
Unlike many decades ago, few if any practicing academic economists to-
day are well versed in the philosophy of science. And worst of all, some 
might complain, few if any economic model builders today would ever 
see themselves as a part of an explicit philosophical program – one that 
methodologists or philosophers might spend any of their time explaining. 
But economic methodologists have been trying to explain how models are 
used in economics for many years (see Boland forthcoming, ch.11).
As I noted already and methodologists will note as well, models of the 
economy have been around for a long time and often the first is credited 
to Tinbergen and his macro-econometric models about data available to 
him in the late 1930s (see Morgan 2008). Interestingly, prior to the inter-
est in building econometric models, economic data or economic ideas 
were represented with abstract objects. For example, there are diagrams 
such as those in Marshall’s 1890 book, Principles of Economics, that illustrate 
market demand and supply curves – the same ones that we still use in 
beginning economics classes. And when it comes to the macroeconom-
ics still found in textbooks, there is the IS-LM diagrams first created by 
Hicks. And going much further back, there is a much less well-known 
physical macro-model created by Irving Fisher (1892). It was actually a 
model consisting of hydraulics and tubes such that with the functioning of 
which we could actually see it representing an economy involving a three-
good, general equilibrium system in process.  
As I have already explained, after I conducted the surveys on my col-
leagues, it seems that among economic model builders there is a clear 
difference between the pre- and post-1980 view about what economists 
think constitutes a model in economics. However, if one were to consider 
the writings of most philosophers and methodologists of economics (see 
Hands 2001), one would get the impression that their view of the rela-
tionship between economic models and economic theories is stuck in the 
pre-1980s perspective – just as I was in 1989! The most common view 
about models is about their role in economics. That view is that models 
are representations of theories constructed for the purpose of serving as 
tools or instruments. Such models, particularly empirical models, have 
been created purely for the purpose of measurement or empirical inves-
tigation (see Boumans 2001). This includes those models thought to be 
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built for quantifying a theoretical hypothesis so as to be able to express 
the hypothesis in terms of parameters and coefficients that can be ‘mea-
sured’ using observable data. This aspect of model building, particularly 
when it is done for the purpose of testing theories and models – particu-
larly macroeconomic models – is explored in more detail in Part 3 of my 
forthcoming book.
It should be noted that the idea of a model being used as an instrument is 
a very old idea, one that existed long before economists began building 
models. It is the common methodological idea that philosophers of sci-
ence call ‘instrumentalism’ (see Boland 2003, ch. 1 and 5). While today 
many now associate the idea of instrumentalism with Milton Friedman’s 
1953 view of methodology (as I explained in Boland 1979), it has a much 
longer history going back at least to the beginning of the 18th Centu-
ry maybe even further back to the 17th Century’s Cardinal Bellarmino. 
While the Cardinal was merely suggesting that Galileo should consider his 
heliocentric view of the planets to be just a convenient instrument (viz, 
nothing more than a useful mathematical hypothesis), among historians of 
science the common view of instrumentalism is more due to a later at-
tempt by a Bishop Berkeley who wished to preempt the growing interest 
in Newton’s mechanics. The problem that the Bishop addressed was that 
Newton’s theory (and his widely recognized scientific authority) was be-
ing used by some 18th Century philosophers to show that the Church was 
unneeded for understanding the Heavens and Earth (see Becker 1932). 
What Berkeley wanted was that we should consider Newton’s theories 
to be limited to mere measuring tools for predicting the movements of 
planets. If we were to do this, he thought Newton’s theories would not 
need be considered true. And as such, Newton’s theories should also not 
be considered competitors for the universal truths that Berkeley’s Church 
had the responsibility for determining, of course. 
For most academics, the role of the Church is rarely if ever at issue. Nev-
ertheless, the idea of economic models being built to serve as instruments 
clearly does seem to mean that they should be judged only in terms as 
to whether they successfully do the intended job rather than whether 
they are to be considered empirically true or false representations of the 
economy. Instrumentalism in economics and economic model building 
today is, as I said, simply an application of Friedman’s 1953 methodology. 
One suspects that all too often in the 1950s and ‘60s many critics of his 
methodology were to merely eager (dare I say ideologically) to dismiss 
his methodology given that instrumentalism then as now is alive and well 
in the business of building economic models, particularly econometrics-
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based models. But, the only effective criticism of Friedman’s methodol-
ogy, as I explained at the end of my 1979 article, is to point out that the 
only consistent defense of his methodology is at best circular. And as such, 
I think the best that one can say about Friedman’s methodology is that it 
seems to be stuck in the 18th Century.
One methodological complaint about the usual microeconomics textbook 
theory or model of a decision maker – whether that be an individual con-
sumer or any single agency such as a firm – is that we rarely find a model 
builder considering a model’s behavioural and situational assumptions as 
literally true. One could even say that there is a tendency to treat the 
textbook firm in particular as a ‘black box’. Specifically, the firm is con-
sidered only in terms of measured inputs and outputs. The behavioural as-
sumptions we make to build models are in effect merely about the unseen 
contents of the black box. But more important, the black box character-
ization of, say, the model of a firm invites an instrumentalist viewpoint. If 
the observed outputs of an observed real firm matches (by some accept-
able criterion) the model’s predicted output, some model builders will 
ask you whether the truth status of the model’s behavioural assumptions 
even matters. For anyone who would say it does, then they are accepting, 
at least, the limits to the usefulness of instrumentalism. For those who do 
not think it matters, what is the alternative if it is not just instrumental-
ism? 
If one does not accept the black box perspective, then perhaps at mini-
mum one is asking instead for some sort of transparent box. We could go 
as far to say that this is a goal of model builders engaged producing ‘exhib-
its’ in experimental and behavioural economics. Their models are simply 
rejections of the black box perspective for one where observable data 
are to be our real concern. Of course, it may be all a matter of attitude, 
particularly whenever instrumentalism can be seen to be an acceptable 
methodological or philosophical position regarding the contents of the 
textbook’s black box. 
Concluding remarks.
Well, I think that the old pre-1980s view of models is alive and well, both 
in the practice of game theory as well as behavioural and experimental 
economics even though most young participants will not think so. This 
is, I think, merely a terminological problem, not one of actual practice of 
model building in economics.
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